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Abstract. Recently, there have been several attempts in establishing
formal RFID privacy models in the literature. These models mainly fall
into two categories: one based on the notion of indistinguishability of two
RFID tags, denoted as ind-privacy, and the other based on the unpre-
dictability of the output of an RFID protocol, denoted as unp-privacy.
Very recently, at CCS’09, Ma et al. proposed a modiﬁed unp-privacy
model, referred to as unp′-privacy. In this paper, we ﬁrst revisit the ex-
isting RFID privacy models and point out their limitations. We then
propose a new RFID privacy model, denoted as unp∗-privacy, based on
the indistinguishability of a real tag and a virtual tag. We provide jus-
tiﬁcation for the new model and formally clarify its relationship with
ind-privacy model. Finally, we modify Ma et al.’s 2-round RFID proto-
col to a 3-round mutual authentication RFID protocol and prove that it
is of unp∗-privacy.
Keywords: RFID, privacy, security.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) has been widely envisioned as an in-
evitable replacement of barcodes and other consumer labeling techniques for
automatic object identiﬁcation. An RFID system consists of small devices called
RFID tags, one or more RFID readers and a back-end database. Unlike bar-
codes, each RFID tag records a suﬃciently long bitstring to uniquely identify
the tag or its bearer. RFID readers communicate with RFID tags using RF
signals at a distance from a few inches to several feet. Since RF signals are invis-
ible and penetrating, RFID systems provide a perfect environment for attackers.
The prevalence of RFID technologies introduces various serious risks and poses
unique security concerns [9,15].
Security problems in RFID systems can be classiﬁed into two types. The ﬁrst
is concerned with attacks which aim to wipe out the functioning of the system.
The second type, the one which interests us here, is related to privacy. In particu-
lar, unauthorized tracking of RFID system users and RFID tag bearers has been
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recognized as one of the most imperative privacy concerns in the deployments
of RFID systems. A privacy-preserving RFID system should therefore provide
anonymity (i. e., conﬁdentiality of a tag’s identity) as well as unlinkability of
the protocol transcripts of a tag [17]. Much attention has been devoted to RFID
security, and various schemes have been proposed. The research for secure RFID
systems can be mainly categorized into physical technologies [11,5] and protocol-
based techniques [21,7,14,19,10,18,6,1]. Juels provides a survey of much of the
related literature in [9] and Avoine maintains a current online bibliography at
[2]. Nevertheless, most of the existing RFID security research eﬀorts lack formal
analysis and mainly oﬀer ad hoc notions of security. In this paper, we are con-
cerned with formal provable privacy models for RFID systems, with a focus on
protocol-based techniques.
1.1 Related Work
Avoine [3] ﬁrst formalizes the adversary model in RFID systems and proposes
very general and ﬂexible deﬁnitions of RFID privacy. Based on the formal ad-
versary model, Juels and Weis [12] deﬁne the notion of strong privacy. The aim
of Avoine [3] is to capture a range of adversarial abilities, while Juels and Weis
[12] seek to characterize a very strong adversary with a relatively simple def-
inition. In other words, Juels and Weis [12] aim for speciﬁcity and simplicity
over ﬂexibility. The privacy notion in [12] is based on the indistinguishability of
two RFID tags, denoted as ind-privacy. However, to our knowledge, there is no
RFID protocol that has been directly proven to be of ind-privacy; On the other
hand, if an RFID protocol is not of ind-privacy, it can be checked against the
ind-privacy model easily.
Vaudenay [20] considers side-channel attacks in his RFID privacy model and
proposes eight privacy classes which are later consolidated to three by Ng et al.
[22]. Paise and Vaudenay [16] extend the deﬁnitions in [20] to address mutual
authentication. However, the privacy deﬁnitions in [20,22,16] contradict reader
authentication for any privacy notion that allows tag corruption.
In [8], Ha et al. propose a diﬀerent privacy model based on the unpredictabil-
ity of tag outputs, denoted as unp-privacy. Unfortunately, this model was later
shown to have some deﬁciencies in its deﬁnition [4]. Recently, Ma et al. [13] pro-
pose a reﬁned unp-privacy model for RFID systems, denoted as unp′-privacy,
and investigate the relationship between ind-privacy and unp′-privacy.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we address formal RFID privacy models with the following main
contributions:
1. We revisit the unp′-privacy model in [13] and point out its limitation. Specif-
ically, though the unp′-privacy model is robust for 2-round RFID protocols
but falls short in dealing with 3-round (i. e., mutual authentication) proto-
cols. We demonstrate this by presenting a 3-round RFID protocol which has
a ﬂaw with respect to privacy but can be proven to be of unp′-privacy.
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2. We propose a new privacy model, denoted as unp∗-privacy, based on the
indistinguishability of a real tag and a virtual tag. We clarify the relationship
between the ind-privacy and the unp∗-privacy by formally proving that the
former is weaker than the latter. To understand which level of privacy an
RFID system provides, it is critical to clarify the relationship between the
privacy notions.
3. We modify and extend the RFID protocol in [13] to 3-round mutual authen-
tication protocol and show that it is of unp∗-privacy.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy discuss the
formal deﬁnitions for the ind-privacy and the unp-privacy models. We revisit
and re-examine the unp′-privacy model in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce
our privacy model, establish its relation with the ind-privacy model and show
that an improved version of the protocol in [13] is of unp∗-privacy. We conclude
in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
If S is a set, then s ∈R S indicates that s is chosen uniformly at random from
S. If x1, x2, . . . are strings, then x1‖x2‖ . . . denotes their concatenation. Let y ←
AO1,...,On(x1, x2, . . .) denote that y be assigned with the output of the algorithm
A which takes x1, x2, . . . as inputs and has accesses to oracles O1, . . . ,On.
2.1 Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function is a family of functions with the property that the
input-output behavior of a random instance of the family is “computationally
indistinguishable” from that of a random function. Let F : Keys(F )×D → R be
a family of functions and let RandD→R be the family of all functions with domain
D and range R, where Keys(F ) is the set of keys (or indexes) of F . Consider the
following game between an attack algorithm A and a challenger.
GameprfA
 β ∈R {0, 1};
 If β = 0 then g ∈R RandD→R, else g ∈R F ;
 β′ ← Ag.
Throughout the game, we assume that A makes at most q oracle queries. We
deﬁne A’s advantage in the above game as
AdvA(q) =
∣
∣
∣
∣Pr[β = β
′]− 1
2
∣
∣
∣
∣ .
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Definition 1. An adversary A (t, q, )-breaks the pseudorandomness of the func-
tion family F if the advantage AdvA(q) of A in the above game is at least  and
the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 2. A function family F is said to be (t, q, )-pseudorandom if there
exists no adversary who can (t, q, )-break the pseudorandomness of F .
2.2 An RFID System Model
Without loss of generality, we assume a ﬁxed, polynomial-size tag set T =
{T1, . . . , Tn}, a reader R and a back-end database DB as the elements of our
RFID system, denoted as S = {T ,R,DB}. Typically, each tag is a passive
transponder identiﬁed by a unique ID and has only limited memory which can
be used to store several keys and/or state information. The reader R is com-
posed of one or more transceivers and a processing subsystem. The database DB
maintains T ’s authentication data such as tag IDs, secret keys, states and session
identiﬁers. Communications between R and T take place over an insecure air
interface, while communications between R and DB are assumed to be over a
secure channel.
In addition, the RFID system S includes a tuple of algorithms described
bellow.
Initialize(κ): It takes as input a security parameter κ, generates key ki for each
tag Ti ∈ T and sets the tag’s initial state; it also associates Ti with its
unique IDi and setups the back-end database DB for R to store necessary
information for tag identiﬁcation.
ReaderStart(): It invokes R to output a new session identiﬁer sid and the ﬁrst
protocol message m1 of the session.
TagCompute(sid,m1, Ti): It takes as input a session identiﬁer sid, a protocol
message m1 and Ti, outputs a message m2. This algorithm is run by Ti.
ReaderCompute(sid,m2): It takes as input a session identiﬁer sid and a protocol
message m2, outputs a protocol message m3. This algorithm is run by R.
Execute(R, Ti): It takes as input R and Ti, runs the interactive authentication
protocol between R and Ti and outputs the entire protocol transcript. For
the three-round canonical RFID protocol shown in Fig 1, we have
(m1,m2,m3) ← Execute(R, Ti),
Reader R Tag Ti
m1∈{0,1}l1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m2∈{0,1}l2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
m3∈{0,1}l3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1. The canonical RFID Protocol
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where (sid,m1) ← ReaderStart(),m2 ← TagCompute(sid,m1, Ti) and m3 ←
ReaderCompute(sid,m2).
2.3 Adversaries
An adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm and is as-
sumed to have complete control over all communications between R and T .
The interaction between A and the protocol participants occurs only via or-
acle queries, which model the adversary’s capabilities in a real attack. In the
following, we specify oracles A is permitted to query.
Launch(R): It invokes R to start a session of the protocol and responds with
a session id sid and the ﬁrst protocol message m1.
SendTag(sid,m′1, Ti): It invokes Ti and responds with a protocol message m2.
SendReader(sid,m′2): It invokes R and responds with a protocol message m3.
Reveal(Ti): It invokes Ti and returns the tag’s current secret key and internal
state.
Queries to SendTag and SendReader model active attacks, in which the ad-
versary may tamper with the message being sent over the insecure RF channel.
Queries to Reveal model the leakage of tags’ secret information.
Let O1,O2,O3 and O4 denote Launch, SendTag, SendReader and Re-
veal oracles, respectively. All privacy models in this paper are deﬁned using a
game between an adversary A and a challenger. Throughout a game, we assume
that A is allowed to launch O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracle queries without exceeding
qini, qst, qsr and qrv overall calls, respectively.
2.4 The ind-Privacy and unp-Privacy Models
2.4.1 The ind-Privacy Model
Juels and Weis [12] present an indistinguishability-based RFID privacy model
which is reminiscent of the classic indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext at-
tack (IND-CPA) and under chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) cryptosystem
security.
Figure 2 illustrates the ind-privacy game GameindA [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv], in
which A is comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2). The game proceeds as
follows. At ﬁrst, the challenger initializes the RFID system S by producing a
readerR and a set of tags T = {T1, ..., Tn} according to the security parameter κ.
Then, A1 issues O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracle queries, and outputs two uncorrupted
tags {Ti, Tj} (i.e., tags to which no Reveal queries have been issued) as challenge
candidates. It also outputs a state information st which will be transmitted to
algorithm A2. One of the two candidates Tc is then selected based on the value
of a random bit and presented to A (eﬀectively as a tag oracle). A2 is allowed to
query O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracles on R, Tc and the tag set T ′ = T −{Ti, Tj} with
the restriction that it cannot query Reveal(Tc). Finally, A2 is asked to guess
the random bit.
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GameindA [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv]
 Setup the reader R and a set of tags T = {T1, . . . , Tn};
 {Ti, Tj , st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T );
 Set T ′ = T − {Ti, Tj};
 β ∈R {0, 1};
 If β = 0 then Tc = Ti, else Tc = Tj ;
 β′ ← AO1,O2,O3,O42 (R, T ′, Tc, st).
Fig. 2. The ind-Privacy Game
Definition 3. The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined
as
AdvindA (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses
of A.
Definition 4. An adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the ind-privacy
of an RFID system S if the advantage AdvindA (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) of A in the
above game is at least  and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 5. An RFID system S is said to be (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-ind-
privacy if there exists no adversary who can (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-break the
ind-privacy of S.
2.4.2 The unp-Privacy Model
The goal of the adversary in the above ind-privacy game is to distinguish two
diﬀerent tags within its computational power and parameters. The idea is in-
tuitively appealing; however, the ind-privacy model is diﬃcult to apply directly
in proving given a protocol is of ind-privacy. Juels and Weis [12] only prove
the ind-privacy of a simple randomized hash-lock RFID protocol. To our knowl-
edge, no mutual authentication RFID protocol has been proven directly to be
of ind-privacy. Ha et al. [8] propose a diﬀerent privacy model based on the un-
predictability of tag outputs, denoted as unp-privacy. In fact, Juels and Weis
[12] prove the ind-privacy of the randomized hash-lock RFID protocol by show-
ing that no adversary can distinguish the real output of a tag from a random
value. In other words, Juels and Weis [12] in fact prove the unp-privacy of the
randomized hash-lock RFID protocol.
Figure 3 depicts the unp-privacy game GameunpA [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv], in
which an adversary A is comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2). At ﬁrst,
a challenger initializes the RFID system by producing a reader R and a set of
tags T = {T1, ..., Tn} according to the security parameter κ. Then, A1 issues
O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracle queries, and outputs an uncorrupted tag Tc as the
challenge tag. It also outputs a state information st which will be transmitted
to algorithm A2. Next, the challenger selects a random bit β and sends m∗2 to
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A2, where m∗2 is taken from (m∗1,m∗2,m∗3) ← Execute(R, Tc) if β = 1, and
m∗2 ∈R {0, 1}l2 otherwise. Finally, A2 is asked to guess the random bit. Note
that A2 is not allowed to query any oracle.
GameunpA [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv]
 Setup the reader R and a set of tags T = {T1, . . . , Tn};
 {Tc, st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T );
 β ∈R {0, 1};
 If β=1 then m∗2 is taken from (m∗1,m∗2,m∗3)← Execute(R, Tc),
else m∗2 ∈R {0, 1}l2;
 β′ ← A2(m∗2, st).
Fig. 3. The unp-Privacy Game
Definition 6. The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined
as
AdvunpA (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses
of A.
Definition 7. An adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the unp-privacy
of RFID system S if the advantage AdvunpA (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) of A in the
above game is at least  and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 8. An RFID system S is said to be (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-unp-
privacy if there exists no adversary who can (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-break the
unp-privacy of S.
3 The unp′-Privacy Model, Revisited
Note that in the unp-privacy game, the adversary A2 does not get the full
transcript of the protocol execution between the reader and the challenge tag,
but only m∗2 which is either a random message or the message sent by the tag.
As a result, an RFID protocol may have known weakness in privacy but can
be shown to be of unp-privacy, as conﬁrmed by Deursen and Radomirovic´ [4].
At CCS’09, Ma et al. [13] propose an improved unp-privacy model, denoted as
unp′-privacy. In the unp′-privacy model, the adversary is given not only m∗2, but
also the last message m∗3 of the protocol. The unp′-privacy model is robust for
2-round RFID protocols, as demonstrated in [13]; however, we will show in this
section that the model has a deﬁciency when applied to 3-round protocols.
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3.1 The Model
Figure 4 presents the unp′-privacy game Gameunp
′
A [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv], in
which an adversary A is comprised of a pair of algorithms (A1,A2). At the
start of the game, a challenger initializes the RFID system by producing R
and T = {T1, ..., Tn} according to the security parameter κ. Then, A1 issues
O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracle queries, and outputs an uncorrupted challenge tag
Tc and a message m∗1. It also outputs a state information st which will be
transmitted to algorithm A2. Next, the challenger selects a random bit β and
sends (m∗2,m
∗
3) to A2, where (m∗1,m∗2,m∗3) ← Execute(R, Tc) if β = 1, and
(m∗2,m
∗
3) ∈R {0, 1}l2 ×{0, 1}l3 otherwise. Finally, A2 has oracle accesses to tags
except Tc and is required to infer the value of β.
Gameunp
′
A [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv]
 Setup the reader R and a set of tags T = {T1, . . . , Tn};
 {Tc,m∗1, st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T );
 Set T ′ = T − {Tc};
 β ∈R {0, 1};
 If β = 1 then (m∗1,m∗2,m∗3)← Execute(R, Tc),
else (m∗2,m
∗
3) ∈R {0, 1}l2 × {0, 1}l3;
 β′ ← AO1,O2,O3,O42 (R, T ′,m∗2,m∗3, st).
Fig. 4. The unp′-Privacy Game
Definition 9. The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined
as
Advunp
′
A (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr , qrv) = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses
of A.
Definition 10. An adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the unp′-privacy
of RFID system S if the advantage Advunp′A (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) of A in the
above game is at least  and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 11. An RFID system S is said to be (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-unp′-
privacy if there exists no adversary who can (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-break the
unp′-privacy of S.
3.2 A Counterexample
Ma et al. [13] introduce an eﬃcient 2-round protocol and prove that it is of
unp′-privacy. We now modify the protocol to a 3-round mutual authentication
protocol and show that the new protocol has clear weakness with respect to
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privacy but can be proven to be of unp′-privacy. This example therefore exposes
a deﬁciency of the unp′-privacy model when it is applied to 3-round mutual
authentication protocols.
Let F : {0, 1}lk × {0, 1}ld → {0, 1}lr be a PRF family. Let ctr ∈ {0, 1}lr
be a counter, pad1 ∈ {0, 1}lp1 and pad2 ∈ {0, 1}lp2 be two paddings such that
lr + lp1 = ld. The RFID system is constructed as follows.
Initialize(κ): It randomly chooses a key ki ∈ {0, 1}lk for each tag Ti ∈ T . Ti stores
ki, a counter ctri ∈ {0, 1}lr , and a 1-bit ﬂag si in its memory. Initially, ctri =
1 and si = 0. It also associates Ti with a unique IDi, and stores the tuple
(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi) in the back-end database DB, where Ii = Fki (ctri‖pad1).
Execute(R, Ti): R ﬁrst sends a challenge c ∈R {0, 1}lc to Ti, where lc+ lr+ lp2 =
ld. Upon receiving c, Ti executes the following steps:
1. Randomly choose r2 ∈ {0, 1}lp2 and compute Ii = Fki(ctri‖pad1);
2. Set r1 = Fki(c‖Ii‖pad2)⊕ ctri if si = 0, else set r1 = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2)⊕ ctri;
3. Respond with (r1‖Ii, r2), increment ctri by 1 and set si = 1.
Upon receiving the response (r1‖Ii, r2),R identiﬁes the tag from its database
as follows:
1. Search for the tuple (Ii, ki, ctr′i, IDi) using Ii as an index. If such a tuple
exists, compute Fki(c‖Ii‖pad2) and then
(a) If ctr′i = Fki(c‖Ii‖pad2) ⊕ r1, update ctr′i = ctr′i + 1 and Ii =
Fki(ctr′i‖pad1), respond with f = Fki(c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag;
(b) Else abort the protocol.
2. Else look up the database for a tuple (I ′i , ki, ctr
′
i, IDi) in an exhaustive
search such that ctri = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2)⊕ r1 and Fki(ctri‖pad1) = Ii. Then
(a) If such a tuple exists, update ctr′i = ctri+1 and I
′
i = Fki(ctr
′
i||pad1),
respond with f = Fki(c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag;
(b) Else abort the protocol.
Upon receiving f , Ti checks whether f = Fki(c‖ctri‖r2). If not, Ti rejects
the reader. Else, Ti sets si = 0 and accepts the reader.
Note that the ReaderStart, TagCompute and ReaderCompute algorithms are not
shown explicitly in the above description since they are embedded in the Execute
algorithm. The protocol is depicted in 5.
A ﬂaw of the protocol is that an active attacker can ﬁnd out whether a tag’s
state is s = 0 or s = 1. If a tag is in state s = 0, the reader does not verify
the integrity of r2; while if the tag is in state s = 1, this veriﬁcation occurs
implicitly. Note that under normal circumstances tags will be in state s = 0.
Hence, an active attacker can ﬂag a tag by setting its state to s = 1 and trace
the tag in subsequent protocol sessions. However, the following theorem states
that the protocol is of unp′-privacy.
Theorem 1. The above mutual authentication RFID protocol is of (, t, n, qini,
qst, qsr , qrv)-unp′-privacy, assuming the function family F : {0, 1}lk ×{0, 1}ld →
{0, 1}lr is (t′, q, ′)-pseudorandom, where
t′ ≈ t, q ≈ qst + qsr, ′ = /n.
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Reader R
{(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi)}
Tag Ti
(ki, ctri, si)
c ∈R{0,1}lc−−−−−−−−−−→
r1‖Ii,r2←−−−−−−−−−−
r2 ∈R {0, 1}lp2 ,
Ii = Fki(ctri‖pad1),
If si = 0,
r1 = Fki(c‖Ii‖pad2)⊕ ctri;
Else,
r1 = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2)⊕ ctri.
ctri = ctri + 1,
si = 1.
If ﬁnd the tuple (Ii, ki, ctr′i, IDi), then
If ctr′i = Fki(c‖Ii‖pad2)⊕ r1, then
update ctr′i = ctr
′
i + 1 and Ii = Fk(ctr
′
i‖pad1),
compute f = Fki(c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag.
Else abort.
Else If ∃(I ′i, ki, ctr′i, IDi) such that
ctri = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ r1 and Fki(ctri‖pad1) = Ii,
then
update ctr′i = ctri + 1 and I
′
i = Fki(ctr
′
i‖pad1)
compute f = Fki(c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag.
Else abort.
f−−−−−−−−−−→
If f = Fki(c‖ctri‖r2),
set si = 0 and accept the reader.
Else,
reject the reader.
Fig. 5. The Counterexample RFID Protocol
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the
unp′-privacy of the RFID protocol in Figure 5. We are going to construct another
PPT B that makes use of A to (t′, q, ′)-break the pseudorandomness of the
function family F .
B is provided oracle access to a function g and tries to decide if g is drawn
at random from F , namely g ∈R F (which means that a key is chosen via k ∈R
{0, 1}lk and then g is set to Fk.), or is drawn at random from Rand{0,1}
ld→{0,1}lr ,
namely g ∈R Rand{0,1}
ld→{0,1}lr . B’s goal is to output 0 if g ∈R Rand{0,1}
ld→{0,1}lr
and 1 otherwise. B runs A as a subroutine and proceeds as follows.
Setup B randomly chooses an index j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Without loss of generality,
we assume j = n. B then randomly chooses a key ki ∈ {0, 1}lk for each tag
Ti ∈ {T1, . . . , Tn−1}. Ti stores ki, a counter ctri ∈ {0, 1}lr , and a 1-bit ﬂag si.
Initially, ctri = 1 and si = 0. B associates Ti with a unique IDi, and stores
the tuple (Ii, ki, ctri, IDi) in the database DB, where Ii = Fki(ctri‖pad1).
B associates tag Tn with a unique IDn. Tn keeps a counter ctrn and a 1-bit
ﬂag sn with initially values 1 and 0, respectively. Note that, the key kn of Tn
is unknown to B. B queries its oracle on ctrn‖pad1 and gets the response of
the oracle In. B stores the tuple (In, ∗, ctrn, IDn) in the database DB.
In the following, we let x = ctrn‖pad1, m′1‖In‖pad2 or m′1‖In‖r2 depending
on the context. The basic idea is that B queries its oracle g on x and gets
either Fkn(x) or a random message as response .
Query phase 1 A issuesLaunch, SendTag, SendReader andReveal queries
to which B answers as follows:
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– Launch query on R: B responds according to the protocol.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Ti): Respond according to the protocol.
Note that B can do it for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} because B knows the keys
and the internal information of Ti. For Tn, B also can do it by querying
its oracle on x whenever it needs to compute Fkn(x).
– SendReader query on (sid,m′2): Respond according to the protocol.
Whenever B needs to compute Fkn(x), B queries its oracle on x.
– Reveal query on Ti: If Ti = Tn, abort and randomly output a bit; else,
forward the key ki and internal state (ctri, si) of Ti to A.
Challenge A submits a message m1 ∈ {0, 1}lc and an uncorrupted challenge
tag Tc to B which proceeds as follows:
– If Tc 	= Tn, abort and randomly output a bit.
– Else, randomly choose r2 ∈ {0, 1}lp2.
– Set x = ctrn‖pad1, query its oracle on x and get the response In.
– If sn = 0, query its oracle on x = m1‖In‖pad2, get the response y and
set r1 = y⊕ctrn; else query its oracle on x = m1‖In‖r2, get the response
y and set r1 = y ⊕ ctrn.
– Set m2 = (r1‖In, r2), update ctrn = ctrn + 1 and sn = 0.
– Query its oracle on m1‖ctrn‖r2, get the response m3, and send (m2,m3)
to A.
Query phase 2 Let T ′ denote the tag set T −Tc = {T1, . . . , Tn−1}. A continues
to issue Launch, SendTag, SendReader and Reveal queries. B answers
them in as follows:
– Launch query on R: Respond according to the protocol.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Ti ∈ T ′): Respond according to the proto-
col. B can do it because it knows the keys and the internal information
of the tags in T ′.
– SendReader query on (sid,m′2): Respond according to the protocol. B
can do it because it knows DB.
– Reveal query on Ti ∈ T ′: Forward Ti’s key ki and internal state (ctri, si)
to A.
Guess A outputs a bit β′ which B also takes as its output.
If B does not abort during the simulation, B’s simulation is perfect and are
identically distributed as the real one from the construction. It is obvious that the
probability that B does not abort during the simulation is 1/n. In the simulation,
B needs to query its oracle in response to A’s SendTag and SendReader
queries. So, q ≈ qst + qsr. The running time of B is approximately that of A.
This completes the proof.
4 Our Model and Results
The limitation in the deﬁnition of the unp′-privacy model, as shown in the above
example, is due to the constraint imposed on the adversary A2, i. e., A2 only has
access to m∗2 and m
∗
3 as supplied by the challenger and is not allowed to query
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oracles on the challenge tag Tc. In this section, we propose a new RFID privacy
model, denoted as unp∗-privacy, as a remedy to this problem.
The intuition of the unp∗-privacy model is that no adversary should be able to
distinguish the output of a real tag from that of a virtual tag, which is deﬁned
as a tag without any secret information. This implies that no adversary can
link a real tag and its behavior without learning its secret key. We emphasis
that our unp∗-privacy model does not impose any restrictions on the number
of rounds in an RFID protocol. In what follows, we introduce the unp∗-privacy
model, investigate the relationship between this new model and the ind-privacy
model. We also extend the 2-round RFID protocol in [13] to a 3-round mutual
authentication protocol and show that it is of unp∗-privacy.
4.1 The unp∗-Privacy Model
Figure 6 illustrates the unp∗-privacy game Gameunp
∗
A [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv] be-
tween an adversaryA and a challenger, in whichA consists of a pair of algorithms
(A1,A2). The challenger initializes the RFID system S by producing a reader R
and a set of tags T = {T1, ..., Tn} according to the security parameter κ. Then,
A1 issues O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracle queries, and outputs an uncorrupted chal-
lenge tag Tc. It also outputs a state information st which will be transmitted to
algorithm A2. Next, the challenger selects a random bit β. Finally, A2 is asked
to guess the value of the random bit. A2 is allowed to query O1,O2 and O3
oracles on R and Tc. The challenger responds to A2 queries as follows:
– Launch query onR: If β = 0, generate a new session identiﬁer sid, randomly
choose m1 ∈ {0, 1}l1 and forward (sid,m1) to A2; else, run the algorithm
ReaderStart, and forward the result to A2.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Tc): If β = 0, randomly choose m2 ∈ {0, 1}l2
and forward m2 to A2; else, run the algorithm TagCompute(sid,m′1, Tc) and
forward the result to A2.
– SendReader query on input (sid,m′2): If β = 0, randomly choose m3 ∈
{0, 1}l3 and forwardm3 toA2; else, run the algorithmReaderCompute(sid,m3)
and forward the result to A2.
Definition 12. The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined
as
Advunp
∗
A (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses
of A.
Definition 13. An adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the unp∗-privacy
of an RFID system S if the advantage Advunp∗A (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) of A in the
above game is at least  and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 14. An RFID system S is said to be (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-unp∗-
privacy if there exists no adversary who can (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-break the
unp∗-privacy of S.
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Gameunp
∗
A [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv]
 Setup the reader R and a set of tags T = {T1, . . . , Tn};
 {Tc, st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T );
 β ∈R {0, 1};
 β′ ← AO1,O2,O32 (R, Tc, st).
Fig. 6. The unp∗-Privacy Game
4.2 Relationship with ind-Privacy Model
In order to clarify the relationship between the ind-privacy and unp∗-privacy,
we introduce another model, called ind∗-privacy model, as a “bridge” between
the two models. We ﬁrst show that ind∗-privacy is equivalent to ind-privacy and
then prove that unp∗-privacy implies ind∗-privacy and hence ind-privacy.
Figure 7 shows the ind∗-privacy game Gameind
∗
A [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv]. The
ind∗-privacy game is identical to the ind-privacy game given in Figure 2 except
that A2 in the former is only allowed to query O1,O2, and O3 oracles on R
and Tc.
Gameind
∗
A [κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv]
 Setup reader R and a set of tags T = {T1, . . . , Tn};
 {Ti, Tj , st} ← AO1,O2,O3,O41 (R, T );
 β ∈R {0, 1};
 If β = 0 then Tc = Ti, else Tc = Tj ;
 β′ ← AO1,O2,O32 (R, Tc, st).
Fig. 7. The ind∗-Privacy Game
Definition 15. The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined
as
Advind
∗
A (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|,
where the probability is taken over the choice of tag set T and the coin tosses of
the adversary A.
Definition 16. An adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the ind∗-privacy
of RFID system S if the advantage Advind∗A (κ, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv) of A in the
above game is at least  and the running time of A is at most t.
Definition 17. An RFID system S is said to be (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-ind∗-
privacy if there exists no adversary who can (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-break the
ind∗-privacy of S.
488 J. Lai, R.H. Deng, and Y. Li
Theorem 2. For an RFID system S, the ind-privacy and the ind∗-privacy are
equivalent.
Proof. It is obvious that ind-privacy =⇒ ind∗-privacy holds. Now we prove that
ind-privacy ⇐= ind∗-privacy also holds.
Suppose there exists an adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the ind-
privacy of the RFID system S. We are going to construct another PPT B that
makes use of A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv + n − 1)-breaks the ind∗-privacy of the
RFID system S. Let C denote an ind∗-privacy challenger against B. B runs A
executing the following steps.
Setup B maintains a list KS-List. Initially the list is empty.
Query phase 1 A issuesLaunch, SendTag,SendReader andReveal queries.
B answers them in the following way:
– Launch query on R: Issue a Launch query on R to C and forward the
result to A.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Ti ∈ T ): Issue a SendTag query on (sid,m′1,
Ti) to C and forward the result to A.
– SendReader query on (sid,m′2): Issue aSendReader query on (sid,m′2)
to C and forward the result to A.
– Reveal query on Ti ∈ T : Issue a Reveal query on Ti to C and forward
the result to A.
Challenge Adversary A submits two uncorrupted tags Tc0, Tc1 ∈ T . B submits
the same two tags Tc0 and Tc1 to C which responds with a challenge tag
Tc ∈ {Tc0, Tc1}. Then B issues Reveal queries on the tag set T − {Tc0, Tc1}
and stores the results in the list KS-List. B forwards Tc to A. Let T ′ denote
the tag set T − {Tc0, Tc1}+ Tc.
Query phase 2 A continues to issue Launch, SendTag, SendReader and
Reveal queries. B answers them in the following way:
– Launch query on R: Issue a Launch query on R to C and forward the
result to A.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Ti ∈ T ′): If Ti = Tc, issue a SendTag query
on (sid,m′1, Ti) and forward the result to A; else, use the list KS-List to
respond.
– SendReader query on (sid,m′2): Use SendReader oracle and the list
KS-List to respond.
– Reveal query on Ti ∈ {T − {Tc0, Tc1}}: Use the list KS-List to respond.
Guess A outputs a bit β′ which B also takes as its output.
It is obvious that the simulation is perfect. Thus we have shown an adversary A
against the ind-privacy of the RFID system S with advantage  can be used to
construct another adversary B against the ind∗-privacy of the same RFID system
with an identical advantage. Note that, the number of times that B queries the
Reveal oracle is qrv + n − 1. The running time of B is approximate to that of
A. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. Assume that an RFID system S is of (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-
unp∗-privacy, then it is also of (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-ind∗-privacy.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the
ind∗-privacy of the RFID system S. We are going to construct another PPT B
that makes use of A (, t, n, qini, qst, qsr, qrv)-breaks the unp∗-privacy of the same
RFID system S. Let C denote an unp∗-privacy challenger against B. B runs A
executing the following steps.
Setup B does nothing.
Query phase 1 A issuesLaunch, SendTag,SendReader andReveal queries.
B answers them in the following way:
– Launch query on R: Issue a Launch query on R to C and forward the
result to A.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Ti ∈ T ): Issue a SendTag query on (sid,m′1,
Ti) to C and forward the result to A.
– SendReader query on (sid,m′2): Issue aSendReader query on (sid,m′2)
to C and forward the result to A.
– Reveal query on Ti ∈ T : Issue a Reveal query on Ti to C and forward
the result to A.
Challenge A submits two uncorrupted tags Tc0, Tc1 ∈ T . B selects a random
bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge tag Tc = Tc0 if β = 0 and Tc = Tc1
otherwise. B submits Tc to C.
Query phase 2 The adversary continues to issue Launch, SendTag and Send
Reader queries. B answers them as follows:
– Launch query on R: Issue a Launch query on R to C and forward the
result to A.
– SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Tc): Issue a SendTag query on (sid,m′1, Tc)
to C and forward the result to A.
– SendReader query on (sid,m′2): Issue aSendReader query on (sid,m
′
2)
to C and forward the result to A.
Guess A outputs a bit β′. If β = β′, B outputs 1; else, B outputs 0.
The simulation of B is perfect. When the binary coin ﬂipped by the unp∗-privacy
challenger C is equal to 1, the probability of β = β′ is equal to 1/2±; otherwise,
the probability of β = β′ is equal to 1/2, because in this case the challenge tag
Tc is in fact a virtual tag in adversary A’s view. Hence, the advantage of B is
equal to that of A (i. e., ). The running time of B is exactly the same as that
of A. This completes the proof.
Theorem 4. There exists an RFID system that is of ind∗-privacy but is not of
unp∗-privacy.
Proof. Suppose an RFID system S = (R, T ,DB, Initialize,Execute) is of ind∗-
privacy, and the output of the algorithm Execute is (c, r, f). We construct a
new RFID system S′ = (R, T ,DB, Initialize,Execute′) such that (c, r‖r, f) ←
Execute′. It is easy to see that S′ is also of ind∗-privacy. Since every protocol
transcript of S′ is of the form (c, r‖r, f), an adversary can easily distinguish it
from a random tuple (c′, r1‖r2, f ′) by checking whether r1 = r2. Therefore, S′
is not of unp∗-privacy.
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4.3 A Protocol with unp∗-Privacy
We now present a 3-round mutual authentication protocol with unp∗-privacy by
modifying the 2-round protocol in [13]. This RFID protocol is shown in Figure
8. It is important to note that when the reader R fails to identify a tag, it does
not simply abort, but responds with a random message. A detailed description
of the protocol and its proof of unp∗-privacy are given in the full version.
Reader R
{(Ii, ki, ctri, IDi)}
Tag Ti
(ki, ctri)
c ∈R{0,1}lc−−−−−−−−−−→
r1‖Ii,r2←−−−−−−−−−−
r2 ∈R {0, 1}lp2 ,
Ii = Fki(ctri‖pad1),
r1 = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2)⊕ ctri.
ctri = ctri + 1.
If ﬁnd the tuple (Ii, ki, ctr′i, IDi), then
If ctr′i = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2)⊕ r1, then
update ctr′i = ctr
′
i + 1 and Ii = Fk(ctr
′
i‖pad1),
compute f = Fki(c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag.
Else f ∈R {0, 1}lr and reject the tag.
Else If ∃(I ′i, ki, ctr′i, IDi) such that
ctri = Fki(c‖Ii‖r2) ⊕ r1 and Fki(ctri‖pad1) = Ii,
then
update ctr′i = ctri + 1 and I
′
i = Fki(ctr
′
i‖pad1)
compute f = Fki(c‖ctr′i‖r2) and accept the tag.
Else f ∈R {0, 1}lr and reject the tag.
f−−−−−−−−−−→
If f = Fki(c‖ctri‖r2),
accept the reader.
Else,
reject the reader.
Fig. 8. The Mutual Authentication Protocol with unp∗-Privacy
5 Conclusions
In this paper we ﬁrst revisited the formal privacy models for RFID systems ex-
isting in the literature, including the ind-privacy model [12], the unp-privacy
model [8] and the newly proposed unp′-privacy model [13]. In doing so, we have
highlighted their potential limitations or ﬂaws. In particular, for the ﬁrst time,
we pointed out that though the unp′-privacy model is robust when applied to
2-round RFID protocols but has a deﬁciency in dealing with 3-round mutual
authentication RFID protocols. This deﬁciency arises from the constraint that
the adversary in the guessing stage of the unp′-privacy game is not given any
oracle access to the challenge tag. We demonstrated this through a counterex-
ample protocol which has problem with respect to privacy but can be proven to
be of unp′-privacy.
We proposed a new privacy model, denoted as unp∗-privacy, based on the
indistinguishability of the output of a real tag from that of a virtual tag (e.
g., a tag without any secret key). The adversary in the unp∗-privacy game is
given multiple oracle accesses to the challenge tag in the guessing stage. The
new model does not suﬀer from the limitations of the unp-privacy and the unp′-
privacy models. Furthermore, we formally established the relationship between
the ind-privacy and the unp∗-privacy notions by proving that the former is
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weaker than the latter. Finally, we extended the 2-round RFID protocol in [13]
to a 3-round mutual authentication RFID protocol and showed that it is of
unp∗-privacy.
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